Iraq from an Airborne POV

Random trawling of the blogosphere turned up this op-ed piece in the New York Times, written by a group of specialists and NCOs in the 82nd Airborne who are finishing up their 15-month tour in Iraq: (emphasis mine)

As responsible infantrymen and noncommissioned officers with the 82nd Airborne Division soon heading back home, we are skeptical of recent press coverage portraying the conflict as increasingly manageable and feel it has neglected the mounting civil, political and social unrest we see every day. (Obviously, these are our personal views and should not be seen as official within our chain of command.)

The claim that we are increasingly in control of the battlefields in Iraq is an assessment arrived at through a flawed, American-centered framework. Yes, we are militarily superior, but our successes are offset by failures elsewhere. What soldiers call the "battle space" remains the same, with changes only at the margins. It is crowded with actors who do not fit neatly into boxes: Sunni extremists, Al Qaeda terrorists, Shiite militiamen, criminals and armed tribes. This situation is made more complex by the questionable loyalties and Janus-faced role of the Iraqi police and Iraqi Army, which have been trained and armed at United States taxpayers’ expense.

A few nights ago, for example, we witnessed the death of one American soldier and the critical wounding of two others when a lethal armor-piercing explosive was detonated between an Iraqi Army checkpoint and a police one. Local Iraqis readily testified to American investigators that Iraqi police and Army officers escorted the triggermen and helped plant the bomb. These civilians highlighted their own predicament: had they informed the Americans of the bomb before the incident, the Iraqi Army, the police or the local Shiite militia would have killed their families.

As many grunts will tell you, this is a near-routine event. Reports that a majority of Iraqi Army commanders are now reliable partners can be considered only misleading rhetoric. The truth is that battalion commanders, even if well meaning, have little to no influence over the thousands of obstinate men under them, in an incoherent chain of command, who are really loyal only to their militias.

[ ... ]

Given the situation, it is important not to assess security from an American-centered perspective. The ability of, say, American observers to safely walk down the streets of formerly violent towns is not a resounding indicator of security. What matters is the experience of the local citizenry and the future of our counterinsurgency. When we take this view, we see that a vast majority of Iraqis feel increasingly insecure and view us as an occupation force that has failed to produce normalcy after four years and is increasingly unlikely to do so as we continue to arm each warring side.

So I can see one of two possibilities here:
1) The piece is total fabrication, and the New York Times ran it with no checking at all; or
2) The war in Iraq cannot be won under current circumstances, and the grunts on the ground know it.
At the moment, my money's on option two.

The tale of the Iraqi army and police officers helping plant an IED between their respective checkpoints is especially dismaying. Four years into the counterinsurgency and the folks we're supposedly going to turn security over to are setting ambushes for our troops? It's looking more and more like, short of a miracle, there's no good solution for Iraq; a "successful" result will require better than half a million US troops continuously in country for decades, while anything less will be a waste of the lives and treasure we've already spent.

Heckuva job, there, Bushie.

Iraq from an Airborne POV

Random trawling of the blogosphere turned up this op-ed piece in the New York Times, written by a group of specialists and NCOs in the 82nd Airborne who are finishing up their 15-month tour in Iraq: (emphasis mine)

As responsible infantrymen and noncommissioned officers with the 82nd Airborne Division soon heading back home, we are skeptical of recent press coverage portraying the conflict as increasingly manageable and feel it has neglected the mounting civil, political and social unrest we see every day. (Obviously, these are our personal views and should not be seen as official within our chain of command.)

The claim that we are increasingly in control of the battlefields in Iraq is an assessment arrived at through a flawed, American-centered framework. Yes, we are militarily superior, but our successes are offset by failures elsewhere. What soldiers call the "battle space" remains the same, with changes only at the margins. It is crowded with actors who do not fit neatly into boxes: Sunni extremists, Al Qaeda terrorists, Shiite militiamen, criminals and armed tribes. This situation is made more complex by the questionable loyalties and Janus-faced role of the Iraqi police and Iraqi Army, which have been trained and armed at United States taxpayers’ expense.

A few nights ago, for example, we witnessed the death of one American soldier and the critical wounding of two others when a lethal armor-piercing explosive was detonated between an Iraqi Army checkpoint and a police one. Local Iraqis readily testified to American investigators that Iraqi police and Army officers escorted the triggermen and helped plant the bomb. These civilians highlighted their own predicament: had they informed the Americans of the bomb before the incident, the Iraqi Army, the police or the local Shiite militia would have killed their families.

As many grunts will tell you, this is a near-routine event. Reports that a majority of Iraqi Army commanders are now reliable partners can be considered only misleading rhetoric. The truth is that battalion commanders, even if well meaning, have little to no influence over the thousands of obstinate men under them, in an incoherent chain of command, who are really loyal only to their militias.

[ ... ]

Given the situation, it is important not to assess security from an American-centered perspective. The ability of, say, American observers to safely walk down the streets of formerly violent towns is not a resounding indicator of security. What matters is the experience of the local citizenry and the future of our counterinsurgency. When we take this view, we see that a vast majority of Iraqis feel increasingly insecure and view us as an occupation force that has failed to produce normalcy after four years and is increasingly unlikely to do so as we continue to arm each warring side.

So I can see one of two possibilities here:
1) The piece is total fabrication, and the New York Times ran it with no checking at all; or
2) The war in Iraq cannot be won under current circumstances, and the grunts on the ground know it.
At the moment, my money's on option two.

The tale of the Iraqi army and police officers helping plant an IED between their respective checkpoints is especially dismaying. Four years into the counterinsurgency and the folks we're supposedly going to turn security over to are setting ambushes for our troops? It's looking more and more like, short of a miracle, there's no good solution for Iraq; a "successful" result will require better than half a million US troops continuously in country for decades, while anything less will be a waste of the lives and treasure we've already spent.

Heckuva job, there, Bushie.